GR 170658; (June, 2011) (Digest)
G.R. No. 170658; June 22, 2011
ANICETO CALUBAQUIB, WILMA CALUBAQUIB, EDWIN CALUBAQUIB, ALBERTO CALUBAQUIB, and ELEUTERIO FAUSTINO CALUBAQUIB, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS
On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80, declaring a 39.3996-hectare land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, as a military reservation, “subject to private rights, if any there be.” The Republic obtained Original Certificate of Title No. 13562 over the property, Lot No. 2470. In 1995, the Republic filed a complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners, alleging they unlawfully entered and occupied a five-hectare portion of the reservation in 1992. Petitioners, in their answer, claimed they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib, had been in open, continuous possession since the early 1900s, cultivating it as the “Calubaquib Ranch.” They argued their property was excluded from the military reservation by the “private rights” proviso in Proclamation No. 80. A pre-trial conference yielded admissions regarding the title, petitioners’ possession, and a demand to vacate. The trial court, opining the basic facts were undisputed, advised the parties to file a motion for summary judgment. Neither party filed such a motion; in fact, the Republic objected twice, arguing summary judgment was improper due to a genuine factual issue regarding petitioners’ claim of ownership. Nevertheless, on January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order stating, “The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to raise any issue. For this reason, a summary judgment is in order.” Subsequently, without trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on April 26, 2004, dismissing petitioners’ claim and ordering them to vacate and pay rentals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the case presented factual issues requiring a full trial and asking for remand.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed a reversible error in rendering a summary judgment motu proprio (on its own initiative) without a motion from either party and over the objection of the plaintiff-respondent.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition. The rendition of a summary judgment by the trial court was procedurally infirm and a violation of due process.
The Court held that a summary judgment is a procedural device aimed at expediting the disposition of cases where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. However, under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment may be rendered only “upon motion” by a claimant or defending party. The rule does not authorize courts to render summary judgments motu proprio. The trial court’s act of issuing a summary judgment on its own motion, especially after the plaintiff had expressly objected to it on the ground that vital factual issues existed, was a grave abuse of discretion. It deprived the petitioners of their right to a full hearing on the merits of their claim of ownership through acquisitive prescription and the nature of the land prior to 1936. These were factual issues that required the presentation and evaluation of evidence in a trial. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings and trial on the merits.