GR 1705; (April, 1904) (Digest)
G.R. No. 1705 : April 22, 1904
TOMAS BLANCO, petitioner, vs. BYRON S. AMBLER, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE MCMICKING, clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
FACTS:
In December 1902, Sergia Reyes obtained a judgment against Fulgencio Tan-Tonco in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 19, 1902, the court appointed a receiver over all of Tan-Tonco’s business, rights, credits, and movable and immovable property, and enjoined all persons from interfering with said property. Subsequently, on April 3, 1903, petitioner Tomas Blanco also obtained a judgment against Tan-Tonco. Blanco alleges he is unable to execute upon this judgment to collect the sum of P1,000 because Tan-Tonco’s property is in the hands of the receiver and subject to the court’s restraining order. Blanco filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, contending that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in appointing the receiver in the Reyes case, rendering the order void. He seeks to prohibit the respondents from taking any further proceedings under that void order.
ISSUE:
Whether a writ of prohibition is the proper remedy to arrest further proceedings under a void order appointing a receiver, where such appointment was made by a court acting in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
The Court held that where a court, despite having jurisdiction over the suit, exceeds its legitimate powerssuch as by improperly appointing a receivera writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to arrest the tribunal’s further proceedings. The Court cited its prior decision in Bonaplata vs. Ambler (1 Phil. 392), which had already ruled that the appointment of a receiver in the very same case of Reyes vs. Tan-Tonco was made without authority of law. Since the appointment was void for lack of jurisdiction, the ancillary restraining clause forbidding judgment creditors from enforcing their claims against the property was also void. The writ of prohibition, though preventive in nature, properly lies in this case because the property remains in custodia legis under the receiver (as an instrument of the court), and there is ongoing judicial action to be arrested to prevent injury to the petitioner. The writ runs directly against the court and indirectly against the receiver.