G.R. No. 170404; September 28, 2011
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON, [Deceased], JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 117, Pasay City, Respondent.
FACTS
This case originated from a civil complaint for abatement of nuisance filed by petitioner Ferdinand A. Cruz against his neighbor, Benjamin Mina, Jr., docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0401 in the RTC of Pasay City. The petitioner sought to have a “basketball goal” attached to Mina’s residence and protruding into a public alley declared a nuisance. Mina was declared in default, and the petitioner presented evidence ex-parte. In a Decision dated October 21, 2005, respondent Judge Henrick F. Gingoyon declared the basketball goal a public nuisance but dismissed the case, ruling that the petitioner lacked locus standi as the action should be commenced by the city or municipal mayor under Article 701 of the Civil Code. The decision included extensive commentary advising the petitioner to accept the living conditions in his area and to “live and let live.”
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In it, he took exception to the judge’s advice, arguing it was off-tangent and endorsed illegality by suggesting that cramped living conditions justify invading alleys. He further stated, “The court should be reminded that the undersigned plaintiff presented his evidence ex-parte and where else can the court gather these information about the alleys aside from the logical conclusion that the court has been communicating with the defendant, off the record, given that the latter has already been in default.”
Judge Gingoyon set the motion for hearing on November 18, 2005, as requested by the petitioner, and in an Order dated November 11, 2005, directed the petitioner to substantiate his serious charge or show cause on that date why he should not be punished for contempt. The judge noted he had never seen or communicated with the defendant.
On November 18, 2005, the petitioner did not appear at the hearing. Judge Gingoyon, in an Order issued in open court, considered the motion for reconsideration submitted for resolution and, motu proprio, granted the petitioner an additional ten days to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In his Compliance to the Show Cause Order, the petitioner maintained his remarks were justified. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 25, 2005, Judge Gingoyon found the petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court, sentencing him to two days of imprisonment and a fine of ₱2,000.00. The judge ruled that the petitioner’s statements in his motion were disrespectful, offensive, and constituted improper conduct directly tending to degrade the administration of justice.
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the contempt order and praying for its annulment.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding the petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court.
RULING
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the assailed Order dated November 25, 2005, finding the petitioner guilty of direct contempt.
The Court held that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner’s statements in his Motion for Reconsideration—specifically his insinuation that the judge gathered information about the alleys through off-the-record communication with the defaulted defendant—constituted direct contempt. These remarks were disrespectful, offensive, and imputed improper motives to the judge, directly tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. Such conduct, committed through a pleading, is considered misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court as to obstruct justice, punishable as direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
The Court emphasized that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to their protection and the orderly administration of justice. The respondent judge correctly exercised this power summarily, as the contempt was committed in the presence of the court through the filing of a pleading containing contumacious language. The procedural requirements for direct contempt were satisfied: the charge was made in writing, the petitioner was given an opportunity to comment (through the show cause orders), and the order of contempt was entered of record, stating the facts constituting the contempt.
The petitioner’s arguments that his statements were mere inferences or that he was merely “at quandary” were unavailing. The language used was clearly contemptuous as it implied bias and improper conduct on the part of the judge. The Court also noted that the petitioner’s failure to avail of the correct remedy—filing a motion for reconsideration of the contempt order or a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals—before coming to the Supreme Court, rendered his petition procedurally infirm. However, the Court opted to resolve the case on its merits given the nature of the contempt charge.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court further directed that copies of the decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for possible administrative action against the petitioner, a member of the Bar, for his disrespectful language toward a judge.