GR 169554; (October, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 169554; October 28, 2009
NIEVA M. MANEBO, Petitioner, vs. SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA and NUMERIANO SAPIANDANTE, Respondents.
FACTS
A complaint for murder was filed against SPO1 Roel Acosta and Barangay Captain Numeriano Sapiandante for the killing of Bernadette Dimatulac. Eyewitness Flordeliza Bagasan identified Acosta as the gunman who shot the victim inside a chapel. Another witness, Severino Sardia, testified he saw two armed men flee the scene and board a getaway jeep, which he identified as being driven by Sapiandante. The National Bureau of Investigation recommended the filing of an information, which was approved by a State Prosecutor. An Information for Murder was subsequently filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Respondents denied the accusations. Acosta interposed alibi, claiming he was on official assignment elsewhere, and questioned the credibility of Bagasan, noting a police report initially named a different companion for the victim. Sapiandante denied being the driver, claiming he did not know how to drive. The Secretary of Justice, upon respondents’ appeal, reversed the prosecutor’s resolution and ordered the withdrawal of the information, citing inconsistencies in the witnesses’ affidavits and the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.
ISSUE
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the finding of probable cause and ordering the withdrawal of the murder information.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. The Court emphasized that in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor’s duty is merely to determine the existence of probable cause, which is defined as a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. This determination is based on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime was committed by the respondents. The Court clarified that it is not a function to rule on the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, which are matters reserved for a full-blown trial.
The Secretary of Justice overstepped this limited authority by making a definitive assessment of the witnesses’ credibility, such as doubting Bagasan’s identification due to a variance in the name initially listed in a police blotter, and by giving undue weight to the respondents’ defenses of alibi and denial at the investigatory stage. These are factual issues that require the testing of evidence in a trial where the court can observe demeanor and conduct cross-examination. By dismissing the positive identification of two eyewitnesses based on these preliminary doubts, the Secretary effectively terminated the case without trial, thereby depriving the court of its jurisdiction to try the case and determine guilt or innocence. This constituted a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to grave abuse of discretion. The Court reinstated the Information and directed the trial court to proceed with the criminal case.