G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007
B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSARIO T. ALZUL, respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Rosario Alzul purchased subdivision lots from petitioner B.E. San Diego, Inc. under a Contract to Sell. She later conditionally assigned her rights to Wilson Yu, who defaulted. Alzul successfully rescinded this assignment in court. Meanwhile, petitioner rescinded the original contract and sold the lots to the Ventura spouses. The Venturas’ action to quiet title was ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 109078, which reinstated petitioner’s titles and ordered Alzul to pay the balance of the purchase price within a non-extendible 30-day period from the entry of judgment on July 12, 1996.
Alzul attempted to pay on August 29 and 30, and September 28, 1996, but petitioner refused acceptance. Alzul then filed a manifestation in the Supreme Court regarding the refusal. The Court, in a January 29, 1997 Resolution, referred the matter to the court of origin for appropriate action. Alzul subsequently filed a complaint for consignation and specific performance before the HLURB, which was dismissed. This dismissal was upheld by the Office of the President. The Court of Appeals reversed, granting Alzul a fresh 5-day period to pay.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting respondent Alzul a new period to pay the purchase price despite the lapse of the Supreme Court’s original 30-day non-extendible period.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the dismissal of Alzul’s complaint. The legal logic is anchored on the finality and immutability of judgments. The Supreme Court’s December 26, 1995 Decision in G.R. No. 109078, which became final upon the entry of judgment on July 12, 1996, explicitly granted Alzul a “non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from entry of judgment” to pay. This period expired on August 11, 1996. Alzul’s subsequent attempts to pay and the consignation action were attempts to revive a right that had already been extinguished by her failure to comply with a final and executory judgment.
The Court emphasized that a final judgment can no longer be altered. The 30-day period was a conditional period for the execution of the judgment in her favor; her non-compliance resulted in the forfeiture of her right to pay. The subsequent referral of her manifestation to the court of origin by the Supreme Court in 1997 was merely for the execution of the final judgment, not for the grant of a new period or a re-litigation of her right to pay. The HLURB and the Office of the President correctly dismissed her complaint, as she no longer had a viable cause of action after the lapse of the mandatory period set by the Supreme Court.