G.R. No. 169204 March 23, 2007
Adelaida Escobar and Lolita Escobar, Petitioners, vs. Ligaya Oligario Luna, et al., Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Adelaida and Lolita Escobar separately bought two parcels of land in Tagaytay City in 1979 and were issued Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). In 1990, Clodualdo Luna filed a complaint to nullify these titles, claiming he had been in actual, adverse possession of the unregistered land since 1941. Luna alleged the Escobars’ titles were derived from a non-existent Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5483, as certified by the Register of Deeds, and that the related decree and survey plan pertained to lands in different provinces.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially dismissed the complaint, ruling the Escobars’ titles were already indefeasible. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for trial. On remand, the RTC again dismissed the case, finding the Escobars to be purchasers in good faith and for value, and ruling that the heirs of Luna (the respondents) failed to prove their case as their documentary evidence was unsupported by testimonial evidence and thus hearsay.

ISSUE

Whether the respondents successfully proved that the petitioners’ TCTs are void ab initio, thereby overcoming the principle of indefeasibility of a torrens title.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision declaring the petitioners’ TCTs void ab initio. The legal logic rests on the fundamental principle that a title void from the beginning cannot produce legal effect. The respondents presented conclusive documentary evidence, including certifications from the Register of Deeds and the Lands Management Bureau, proving that OCT No. 5483—the mother title from which the petitioners’ TCTs were derived—did not exist. Further, the decree and survey plan referenced in the title pertained to entirely different parcels of land in other provinces.
These public documents constituted prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and were not hearsay, as they were issued by public officers in the performance of their official duties. Since the mother title was fictitious, the petitioners’ derivative titles were likewise null and void. A torrens title, while indefeasible, must originate from a valid source. The defense of being a purchaser in good faith and for value is unavailing when the title is void ab initio, as nothing can be acquired from a non-existent source. Consequently, the principle of indefeasibility does not protect a title that is null from its inception.