G.R. No. 168654, March 25, 2009
ZAYBER JOHN B. PROTACIO, Petitioner, vs. LAYA MANANGHAYA & CO. and/or MARIO T. MANANGHAYA, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Zayber John B. Protacio was hired by respondent firm KPMG Laya Mananghaya & Co., a general professional partnership, on April 1, 1996, and was promoted to Tax Principal by October 1, 1997. His compensation package was revised effective October 1, 1998, to include a monthly gross compensation of ₱95,000.00, a 13th month pay, and a year-end lump sum payment. He received a lump sum of ₱573,000.00 for fiscal year 1998 on April 12, 1999. Petitioner resigned effective September 30, 1999. After his resignation, he demanded payment for his 13th month pay, cash commutation of leave credits, reimbursement claims, and his W-2 tax form for 1999. Due to respondent firm’s inaction, he filed a complaint with the NLRC on December 15, 1999. During the proceedings, respondent firm made partial payments for the 13th month pay, leave credits, and reimbursement claims, but petitioner disputed the computations. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, awarding him reimbursement claims, underpayment for leave credits, and a ₱573,000.00 year-end lump sum payment for 1999, plus attorney’s fees. The NLRC modified the award, reducing the reimbursement claim amount but affirming the lump sum and leave credit awards. The Court of Appeals further modified the decision, reducing the awards for leave credits and deleting the lump sum payment entirely, awarding only ₱2,301.00 for reimbursement, ₱9,802.83 for underpayment of leave credits, and ₱10,000.00 attorney’s fees.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of Appeals’ summary denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration violated the constitutional requirement for decisions to state their legal and factual basis.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari when its resolution hinged on a mere evaluation of evidence.
3. Whether the Court of Appeals wantonly abused its discretion in employing a larger divisor to compute petitioner’s daily salary rate, thereby diminishing his benefits.
4. Whether the Court of Appeals capriciously abused its discretion in reversing the concurring findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the compensable nature of petitioner’s year-end lump sum pay claim.

RULING

1. No. The constitutional requirement under Article VIII, Section 14 applies to decisions rendered after cases are submitted for decision. The assailed resolution denying the motion for reconsideration is not a “decision” but a resolution, and it complied with the requirement by stating that after reading the pleadings, no cogent reason was found to reverse the court’s earlier decision.
2. No. While certiorari proceedings generally do not assess the sufficiency of evidence, an exception exists when the factual findings of the labor tribunals are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeals was justified in examining the evidence as it found the NLRC’s award of the lump sum payment unsupported by substantial evidence.
3. No. The Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in its computation. Petitioner, being a monthly-paid employee, is presumed paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. The proper divisor for computing his daily rate is 30.44 days (365 days/12 months), not 26 working days. Using the correct divisor, the underpayment for his leave credits was properly computed at ₱9,802.83.
4. No. The Court of Appeals correctly reversed the award of the year-end lump sum payment. The petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that the lump sum payment for fiscal year 1999 was part of his compensation package. The payment for previous years was discretionary, based on the firm’s profitability and the managing partner’s determination, as stated in the firm’s Amended Articles of Partnership. There was no proof of a clear, deliberate, and voluntary practice by the employer to constitute it as a company practice or part of the compensation package. The lump sum was in the nature of a bonus, which is generally discretionary and not demandable as a matter of right.