GR 168340; (December, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006
RAFAEL GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. HON. TRANQUIL P. SALVADOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, and GLEN DALE a.k.a. RENE MARTEL, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Rafael Gonzales filed a libel complaint against respondent Glen Dale (a.k.a. Rene Martel) for a column published in the Today newspaper. The Makati City Prosecutor found probable cause, and an Information was filed with the Makati RTC. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash, arguing the Information failed to allege the specific venue for libel as required by Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., that the article was printed and first published in Makati or that Gonzales actually resided there. The trial court granted the motion and quashed the Information.
Twenty-six days after receiving the quashal order, petitioner filed a motion to order the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the jurisdictional defect. The trial court granted this motion and directed the filing of an Amended Information. Respondent moved for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which ruled that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to amend, as its quashal order had already become final and executory.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to amend the Information after its order granting the motion to quash had become final.
RULING
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s orders. The legal logic is anchored on the distinction between a dismissal that terminates the case and a quashal that does not. An order granting a motion to quash based on a defect in the Information, such as improper venue, is not a dismissal or an acquittal that bars further prosecution. Under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, such an order does not prevent the filing of a new information for the same offense, provided it is not based on grounds like extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Consequently, the quashal order did not attain such finality as to deprive the trial court of its authority to order the amendment of the Information to correct the jurisdictional defect. The trial court retained control over its proceedings to ensure that the case could be prosecuted on its merits upon the filing of a proper Information. The amendment was a permissible procedural step to cure the deficiency in the original pleading, not a reconsideration of a final judgment. The period for filing a new or amended information is within the court’s discretion for good cause, which was present here.