G.R. No. 168301, March 5, 2007
ANTONIO B. MONFORT III and ILDEFONSO B. MONFORT, Petitioners, vs. MA. ANTONIA M. SALVATIERRA, PAUL MONFORT, RAMON H. MONFORT, JACQUELINE M. YUSAY, YVETTE M. BENEDICTO, ESTER S. MONFORT, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and CITY PROSECUTOR OF CADIZ CITY, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Antonio B. Monfort III and Ildefonso B. Monfort filed a criminal complaint for perjury against private respondents before the City Prosecutor of Cadiz. They alleged that in counter-affidavits submitted for a prior case, respondents falsely declared that the 1996 annual stockholders’ meeting of Monfort Hermanos Agricultural Development Corporation (MHADC) was held on October 16, 1996, and that they were elected as board directors therein. Petitioners insisted the meeting was actually held on November 27, 1996, as stated in the corporation’s 1996 General Information Sheet (GIS) filed with the SEC.
Private respondents countered that the meeting was indeed held on October 16, 1996, and the GIS contained errors made by their corporate accountant, Litonjua, Desabelle and Associates (LDA). They submitted a letter from LDA to the SEC rectifying the date and explaining the mistake. They argued they lacked the willful and deliberate intent to assert a falsehood, a necessary element for perjury.

ISSUE

Whether the Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the dismissal of the perjury complaint for lack of probable cause.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed rulings. The Court held that the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is an executive function, primarily vested in the prosecutor. Judicial review of such determinations is limited to checking for grave abuse of discretion. The Court found no such abuse.
The logic of the ruling hinges on the essential element of willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood required under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code for perjury. Probable cause for this crime demands a reasonable belief that the accused knowingly and intentionally swore to a false statement. The evidence presented—specifically the accountant’s letter admitting error and correcting the SEC record—created sufficient doubt regarding the respondents’ criminal intent. It suggested the discrepancy in dates could be attributable to negligence or an honest mistake in the corporate documentation, not a malicious intent to lie under oath. Since perjury cannot be committed through negligence, the prosecuting officers acted within their discretion in finding no probable cause to indict. The Court emphasized it will not interfere with this executive determination absent a clear case of arbitrariness.