G.R. No. 167763; March 14, 2008
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. JESSIE V. RABANG, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Jessie V. Rabang, a Transportation Regulation Officer at the LTO Bacolod, processed the application of Steniel Young for the assignment of a chassis number to an Isuzu truck presented as a newly rebuilt unit in December 1991. Rabang evaluated the documents, conducted an initial ocular inspection, and recommended the assignment of a Chassis Identification Number (CIN). After Young complied with directives to stamp the CIN and secure a clearance, Rabang conducted a second inspection and issued a Motor Vehicle Inspection Report. His superior subsequently approved the vehicle’s registration.
It was later discovered that the vehicle was stolen from its rightful owner. The DOTC investigated and formally charged Rabang with gross neglect of duty, alleging he failed to conduct a proper ocular inspection as required by law, which would have revealed tampering on the chassis. The DOTC found him guilty of gross negligence and imposed a six-month suspension. The CSC, on appeal, sustained the finding of guilt but modified the penalty to dismissal. Rabang then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding respondent liable only for simple neglect of duty instead of gross neglect of duty, and in ordering the payment of backwages.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s finding of simple neglect of duty but disallowed the grant of backwages. The Court agreed with the CA’s analysis that the charge against Rabang was specifically anchored on his alleged failure to conduct any ocular inspection, as stated in the formal charge. The evidence, however, established that Rabang did conduct two inspections. Therefore, the finding of gross neglect by the CSC, which was based on the premise of a deficient inspection (i.e., missing obvious tampering marks), constituted a modification of the original charge. An administrative tribunal cannot convict an employee of an offense not substantially alleged in the charge, as it violates due process by depriving him of the opportunity to properly defend himself.
Consequently, Rabang’s failure to detect the tampering, despite conducting inspections, constituted simple neglect of duty—a failure to exercise due care—not the conscious indifference or flagrant disregard characteristic of gross neglect. Regarding backwages, the Court ruled that under Section 47, Chapter 6, Title I(A), Book V of the Administrative Code, a decision of removal is immediately executory pending appeal. The respondent is considered under preventive suspension during the appeal; if exonerated, he is reinstated with full pay for the suspension period. However, if the penalty is modified to a suspension, as here, the period of enforced leave is considered the service of the suspension penalty, negating any entitlement to backwages for that interval. The Court thus imposed a three-month suspension without pay.