GR 166993; (December, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166993 December 19, 2005
DSM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA, INC., Respondents.
FACTS
This case involves the execution of a final and executory CIAC arbitral award in favor of petitioner DSM Construction against respondent Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc. The Supreme Court, in a prior decision (G.R. No. 153310), had affirmed the Court of Appeals decision which upheld the CIAC award of approximately ₱62.76 million to DSM. That Supreme Court decision became final and executory on August 12, 2004. Consequently, the CIAC issued an alias writ of execution. The sheriffs levied upon ten condominium units owned by Megaworld, and a public auction was scheduled for March 1, 2005.
Prior to the auction, Megaworld filed a petition with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the sheriffs exceeded their authority by levying on units already sold to third-party buyers and that the levy on ten units was excessive. The Court of Appeals, on February 21, 2005, issued a Resolution granting a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the enforcement of the alias writ and the scheduled execution sale. DSM Construction filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TRO and entertaining a petition that sought to obstruct the execution of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and nullified the Court of Appeals Resolution. The Court held that the issuance of the TRO constituted grave abuse of discretion. A decision that has attained finality is immutable and unalterable; it becomes the law of the case between the parties. Execution of such a decision is a matter of right for the prevailing party. The Court of Appeals’ act of issuing a TRO to halt the execution of a final Supreme Court judgment was a patent evasion of a positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
The proper remedy for Megaworld, if it believed the sheriffs implemented the writ improperly (e.g., by levying on properties of third parties or through an excessive levy), was not a petition for certiorari to restrain the execution entirely, but to avail of the specific remedies under the Rules of Court. For claims of third-party ownership, the remedy is a separate reivindicatory action or a third-party claim under Rule 39, Section 16. For claims of excessive levy, the remedy is a motion in the execution court. By issuing the TRO, the Court of Appeals effectively allowed a collateral attack on a final judgment and disrupted the orderly execution process, which is a ministerial duty following a final judgment. This arbitrary intervention constituted grave abuse of discretion warranting the Supreme Court’s corrective action.