GR 166888; (January, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166888 ; January 31, 2007
FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT CORPORATION and SHIG KATAYAMA, Petitioners, vs. HON. ROMMEL O. BAYBAY, in his capacity as the ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 65, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, RAMON P. JACINTO, JAIME C. COLAYCO, ANTONIO P. TAYAO and GLICERIO PEREZ, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner First Women’s Credit Corporation, through its stockholder Shig Katayama, filed a petition for mismanagement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against its officers. The SEC created an Interim Management Committee (IMC) to preserve corporate assets. Respondents, including the corporation’s president and secretary, allegedly defied the IMC’s directives and prevented its entry into the corporate office. After the IMC dismissed respondent Tayao, he continued to represent himself as president in letters to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This led to the filing of criminal complaints for falsification of private documents and grave coercion.
The Makati City Prosecutor found probable cause for falsification and grave coercion and filed the corresponding Informations. Respondents appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which reversed the finding, directing the withdrawal of the Informations. The trial court granted the DOJ’s motion to withdraw. Petitioners elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the dismissal, holding that the DOJ’s reversal was not attended with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to withdraw the Informations based on the DOJ Secretary’s reversal of the finding of probable cause.
RULING
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the criminal cases. The authority to control criminal prosecution, including the power to dismiss or move for the dismissal of a criminal case, is vested in the prosecuting officer under the direction of the Secretary of Justice. This power is an executive function, subject only to the court’s duty to determine whether the motion to dismiss is made with the express conformity of the prosecutor and whether the dismissal would violate the constitutional right to due process of the offended party.
The Court reiterated the doctrine from Crespo v. Mogul that while a judge cannot be compelled to dismiss a case based on the prosecutor’s motion, he must not arbitrarily disregard the prosecutor’s findings without good reason, such as a clear case of prosecutorial abuse. In this instance, the DOJ Secretary’s finding of lack of probable cause was based on a re-evaluation of the evidence, including the pending appeal of the SEC order and questions regarding Katayama’s authority to file the complaint. The trial court’s deference to this executive determination, absent a clear showing of grave abuse, was proper. The Court found no such abuse, as the DOJ’s conclusion was a permissible exercise of prosecutorial discretion.