GR 166606; (November, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 166606 November 29, 2005
GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON and VAN D. LUSPO, Petitioners, vs. HON. FIRST DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners Guillermo Domondon and Van Luspo, along with other PNP officers, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information, filed in 1994, alleged they conspired in approving and releasing P20 million for ghost purchases of combat equipment. Their arraignment was repeatedly reset over the years due to various pending incidents, including motions for reinvestigation, a petition for certiorari filed by Domondon with the Supreme Court to prevent the filing of an Amended Information, motions to quash, and a co-accused’s motion for a bill of particulars. In December 2003, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the failure to arraign them within the period mandated by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 constituted a denial of their constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss for alleged violation of their right to speedy trial.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The right to a speedy trial is a relative concept, to be determined based on a balancing test considering the length of delay, reasons for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice caused. The Court found that the protracted period before arraignment was not due to vexatious, capricious, or oppressive delays by the State. The postponements were primarily attributable to numerous pending motions and petitions, including those filed by the petitioners themselves, such as their motion for reinvestigation and Domondon’s petition before the Supreme Court. The time taken for the judicial resolution of these incidents was a necessary consequence of ensuring procedural due process for all parties. The delays could not be solely attributed to the prosecution, and petitioners failed to demonstrate that the postponements were sought without justification or that they suffered serious prejudice beyond the ordinary inconvenience of a delayed trial. Consequently, no violation of the right to speedy trial occurred, and the Sandiganbayan correctly denied the motion to dismiss.
