GR 165156; (April, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 165156 ; April 2, 2007
Seagull Maritime Corp. and Seagiant Shipmanagement Co. Ltd., Petitioners, vs. Jaycee Dee and National Labor Relations Commission, Respondents.
FACTS
Jaycee Dee, an able-bodied seaman employed by petitioners, suffered a crushing injury to his left foot in a ship collision in Germany in 2000. After repatriation and undergoing two surgeries and extensive therapy, he continued to experience severe pain and difficulty in weight-bearing and ambulation. He filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits of US$60,000. Petitioners contested the claim, arguing his condition was equivalent to “complete immobility of an ankle joint” under the POEA contract’s schedule, warranting only US$7,465. They emphasized the assessment of their company-designated physician and faulted Dee for refusing a recommended “triple arthrodesis” operation.
The Labor Arbiter ruled for the petitioners, applying the specific POEA schedule rating. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision, awarding Dee the full US$60,000 for permanent total disability. The NLRC gave credence to the medical opinions of other physicians, including Dr. Norberto Meriales and Dr. Rafael Bundoc, who concluded that Dee could no longer return to work as a seaman, with or without further surgery, as his injury necessitated an occupation not involving heavy manual labor or prolonged ambulation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE
Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Dee’s disability was permanent and total, thereby awarding him US$60,000, instead of a partial disability benefit based on the POEA schedule.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, which requires a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The legal logic centered on the proper characterization of disability in labor cases. Disability is not evaluated merely by a medical condition’s name or its placement on a schedule, but by its impact on the seafarer’s capacity to perform his work.
The POEA schedule is not an exhaustive list, and a disability is considered total and permanent if it incapacitates a worker from performing his customary job for more than 120 days, or if it results in an incapacity that prevents him from engaging in gainful employment of the same kind. The consistent medical findings established that Dee could no longer perform the duties of a seaman—a profession demanding physical endurance and mobility. His refusal to undergo further elective surgery was reasonable given the uncertain outcome and the doctors’ consensus that he would still be unfit for sea duty. Therefore, his disability was correctly adjudged as permanent and total, entitling him to the maximum benefit under his contract. The POEA contract must be construed liberally in favor of the seafarer.
