G.R. No. 163255; June 22, 2007
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LIMITED, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL M. SERRANO, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Manuel Serrano purchased several “Diamond Jubilee” life insurance policies from petitioner Insular Life based on representations by its agents that the policies would become self-liquidating after seven years of premium payments. In 1996, Serrano discovered he had overpaid premiums on some policies beyond the seven-year period. His request to apply overpayments to other policies was denied by Insular Life, which clarified that the self-liquidating feature was not guaranteed as it depended on variable dividends, though it provided estimated self-liquidation dates for some policies.
Serrano subsequently published a notice in the Manila Bulletin addressed to “victim” policyholders of Insular Life’s refusal to honor the seven-year self-liquidation representation, calling for a meeting to consider collective action. Insular Life filed a libel complaint against Serrano, alleging the notice depicted the company as having “victimized” or “conned” policyholders, causing dishonor and damage. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, a ruling affirmed by the Secretary of Justice. Insular Life’s petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the libel complaint for lack of probable cause, specifically regarding the existence of defamatory imputation and malice.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court’s decision. The determination of probable cause for filing an information is an executive function vested in the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. Judicial review is limited to ascertaining whether this executive determination was rendered with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, no such abuse was found.
The Court upheld the prosecutors’ finding that the essential elements of libel—defamatory imputation and malice—were absent. The published notice, while using the word “victim,” was based on Serrano’s bona fide belief stemming from his dispute with Insular Life over the policy representations. The notice served as a call for a meeting to discuss a potential collective action, which falls within the sphere of protected communication on matters of public interest. The prosecutors correctly found that the statement was not malicious but made in good faith, in the exercise of the right to seek redress for a grievance. Consequently, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the dismissal of the libel complaint.