GR 162934; (November, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 162934 November 11, 2005
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA JEAN, DANIEL, MELCHOR, MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all surnamed CASTILLO, Petitioners, vs. DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL, Respondent.
FACTS
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel died in 1989. An intestate proceeding was commenced by her mother. Subsequently, Roberto Y. Gabriel, Crisanta’s legally adopted son, filed a petition for probate of an alleged will where he was instituted as sole heir. The two special proceedings were consolidated. Roberto was appointed special administrator but later died. His widow, respondent Dolores Lacuata-Gabriel, filed a motion to be substituted in his stead and appointed as special administratrix. Petitioners, the heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo (who claimed to be Crisanta’s legitimate child), opposed Dolores’s motion and filed their own motion for appointment of Bena Jean Castillo as administratrix. The probate court appointed Dolores as special administratrix, ruling that petitioners were “mere strangers to the case” whose claim of kinship was better ventilated in a separate proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed this appointment.
ISSUE
Whether the probate court gravely abused its discretion in appointing Dolores Lacuata-Gabriel as special administratrix of the estate.
RULING
No, the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the appointment. The Court explained that the rules on the order of preference for the appointment of a regular administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court do not strictly apply to the appointment of a special administrator. The role of a special administrator is temporary, intended to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed, and the probate court enjoys wide discretion in the selection. The paramount consideration is the benefit and interest of the estate. The probate court found Dolores, a law graduate with experience in a law office and the widow of the previously appointed special administrator, to be qualified. The Court held that the probate court acted within its sound discretion, as its finding on Dolores’s qualifications was not shown to be capricious or whimsical. The petitioners’ claim of being compulsory heirs, being contested, did not automatically grant them priority for the special administration. The determination of heirship is a distinct matter that can be resolved in the same probate proceeding at the appropriate time, but it does not preclude the court from making a provisional appointment necessary for estate preservation.
