GR 162103; (June, 2009) (Digest)
G.R. No. 162103; June 19, 2009
MARYLOU B. TOLENTINO, M.D., Petitioner, vs. SHENTON REALTY CORP., Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Marylou B. Tolentino obtained a loan secured by a real estate mortgage over her property. Upon her default, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. At the public auction on September 24, 1999, respondent Shenton Realty Corp. emerged as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued and later annotated on the title. On February 6, 2002, petitioner filed a separate action for judicial redemption against the bank and other parties, later amending it to implead respondent. Subsequently, after the consolidation of ownership, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for a writ of possession. Petitioner moved to intervene in this possession proceeding, but the Regional Trial Court denied her motion and granted the writ.
ISSUE
The core issue is whether the trial court erred in issuing the writ of possession to the respondent, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, despite petitioner’s pending action for judicial redemption and her allegations of procedural defects in the motion for the writ.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the issuance of the writ of possession. The Court clarified that in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser is a ministerial duty upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the bond, as mandated by Act No. 3135. This ministerial duty proceeds from the purchaser’s vested right of ownership following the foreclosure sale and the expiration of the redemption period without a valid redemption. The pendency of a separate action for judicial redemption does not bar this ministerial issuance, as the writ of possession proceeding is summary and non-litigious in nature.
Addressing the substantive claim, the Court found that petitioner’s action for judicial redemption was insufficient to defeat the respondent’s right to possession. Citing precedent, the Court ruled that for a judicial redemption to effectively toll the purchaser’s right to possession, it must be filed in good faith and accompanied by the consignation of the redemption price. The records showed that since filing her action in 2002, petitioner had neither paid nor consigned the redemption price with the court. Between a purchaser who had paid a substantial sum at auction and a mortgagor who had not fulfilled the essential act of consignation, the purchaser is more entitled to possession. The alleged procedural defect regarding the authority of the corporate officer who signed the motion was deemed cured by a subsequent submission of a Secretary’s Certificate, constituting substantial compliance in the interest of justice.