G.R. No. 161864; April 27, 2007
SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. SPS. FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA AUSTRIA, and the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Spouses Dela Cruz filed a complaint for annulment of title and/or reconveyance. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in their favor, but the Regional Trial Court reversed this on appeal. Petitioners, assisted by Atty. Rafael Villarosa, then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition because the attached Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of the petitioners themselves, a violation of procedural rules. Their motion for reconsideration was denied.
Subsequently, petitioners, now assisted by a new counsel, filed a petition for relief from judgment with the Court of Appeals. They argued that the dismissal was due to the gross negligence of their former counsel in preparing the defective certification. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, ruling that clients are generally bound by the mistakes of their counsel and that petitioners failed to timely address their counsel’s alleged incompetence.

ISSUE

The threshold issue is whether petitioners can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Civil Procedure from a judgment of the Court of Appeals based on their counsel’s negligence.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals. The legal logic is twofold: procedural and substantive.
Procedurally, a petition for relief under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy available only against judgments or orders of first-level courts (Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts) and second-level courts (Regional Trial Courts). It is not an available remedy against judgments of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, whose procedures are governed by separate rules. The proper remedy from a denial of a petition for relief is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which petitioners erroneously availed of.
Substantively, even if the Court were to disregard the procedural error, the petition lacks merit. For counsel’s negligence to warrant relief, it must be so gross as to constitute a denial of due process, equivalent to an abandonment of the client’s cause. Here, the act of counsel in signing the certification himself amounted only to simple negligence, not gross negligence. The case had undergone a full-blown trial where all issues were ventilated, and petitioners were given their day in court. The essence of due process—the opportunity to be heard—was thus satisfied. The Court emphasized that while rules of procedure may be liberally construed, strict compliance is indispensable for the orderly dispatch of judicial business, and meritorious defenses alone cannot override procedural lapses absent a valid ground like excusable negligence.