G.R. No. 161776; October 22, 2004
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and PACITA UY, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES DAVID E. ESERJOSE and ZENAIDA ESERJOSE, respondents.

FACTS

Respondents Spouses Eserjose filed a complaint against petitioners Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) and its Branch Manager, Pacita Uy, for release of mortgage and reconveyance. The spouses obtained a loan from ABC, secured by a mortgage on their residential lot, to purchase an adjoining property. The purchased lot was registered in the name of Lucky Find Enterprises, a client of the bank. After fully paying their loan, the spouses demanded the return of their titles. ABC refused, contending that the spouses had also executed a Continuing Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreement, making them sureties for other loans of Lucky Find Enterprises which remained unpaid. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses, declaring the mortgages and surety agreement void and ordering the release and reconveyance of the properties.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Their counsel received the notice of denial on July 9, 2003. The period to appeal expired on July 11, 2003. However, petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on July 14, 2003. The trial court granted the spouses’ motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed out of time. The Court of Appeals affirmed this order.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

RULING

No, the Court of Appeals did not err. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the appellate court’s decision. The reglementary period for perfecting an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Petitioners’ counsel admitted receiving the denial order on July 9, 2003, leaving only two days to file the appeal, which expired on July 11. The notice was filed three days late on July 14. The reason proffered for the delay—inadvertence due to the “volume and pressure of work” in counsel’s law office—was deemed neither compelling nor a highly exceptional circumstance warranting a liberal application of the rules. The Court emphasized that a lawyer, by oath and duty, must diligently monitor case deadlines to prevent prejudice to clients. Allowing such a common excuse would undermine the mandatory nature of procedural periods, which are designed to ensure the orderly administration of justice. The dismissal of the appeal for tardiness was therefore proper.