GR 160976; (June, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 160976; June 8, 2005
SPOUSES ERNESTO ZARATE and MA. ROSARIO ZARATE, petitioners, vs. MAYBANK PHILIPPINES, INC. and PHILMAY PROPERTY, INC., respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners obtained a loan from respondent Maybank, secured by a real estate mortgage. Upon default, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction to Maybank. Petitioners received notice that the redemption period would expire on November 27, 1997. They requested extensions and contested the bank’s accounting, particularly the application of a prior payment of ₱708,950.00. Before the bank could consolidate title, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Pasig, seeking to enjoin consolidation, compel a proper accounting, and extend the redemption period.
After issues were joined, the pre-trial and subsequent trial settings were repeatedly postponed, often at petitioners’ instance for various reasons, including attempts at amicable settlement. The trial was finally set for May 22, 2000, for petitioners to present evidence. On that date, their counsel moved for postponement due to a conflicting hearing. The RTC denied the motion and, upon petitioners’ and their counsel’s failure to appear, dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute.
RULING
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The legal logic rests on the principle that a client is bound by the actions, or inaction, of their counsel. Petitioners’ counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on May 22, 2000, despite notice, and the motion for postponement was properly denied for lack of merit. More critically, petitioners themselves exhibited negligence. The record shows that from May 22, 2000, until the order of dismissal on November 28, 2000, petitioners took no action to ascertain the status of their case or to present their evidence, despite being aware of their counsel’s earlier failure to appear.
This inaction constituted an unreasonable failure to prosecute their action. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, a court may dismiss a case if the plaintiff fails to appear for the presentation of evidence-in-chief or fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time. The petitioners’ protracted delay, without justifiable cause, warranted dismissal. The trial court’s exercise of discretion in dismissing the case was not capricious or whimsical but was justified by the petitioners’ and their counsel’s pattern of neglect, which unduly delayed the proceedings.