GR 159922; (April, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 159922. April 28, 2005
ARMANDO F. CHAN, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, ANTONIO A. ODEJERTE, SERAFIN V. PEREZ, JR., DAVID P. ADONGAY, JR. and VIRGILIO G. ALERIA, Respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Armando F. Chan, then Vice-Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several DPWH officials. He alleged that funds originally awarded for a public toilet project were illegally realigned to construct barangay sports facilities on private property owned by Moises Parane and Nonilon Ebdane. He charged the respondents with illegal use of public funds and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, asserting that the realignment violated rules, the contract was overpriced, and the project was accepted by a barangay captain from a different barangay.
The respondents countered that the property had been donated to Barangay Urdaneta by Raymundo Daza, as evidenced by a Deed of Donation accepted by the Sangguniang Barangay, making it public land. They asserted the realignment was proper and supported by communications with the DBM. They explained the contract was for site development as an initial phase for future sports facilities and that early completion was advantageous to the government. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the findings of the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals. The Court emphasized that the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations is an executive function, primarily vested in the Ombudsman. Judicial review of such determinations is limited to checking for grave abuse of discretion, which signifies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court found no such abuse. The Ombudsman’s finding of no probable cause was based on substantial evidence, including the Deed of Donation which established that the project was implemented on public, donated land, contrary to the petitioner’s claim of it being on private property. The issues raised by the petitioner regarding the authenticity of the deed and the nature of the realignment were factual in nature. In a Rule 45 petition, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and cannot re-examine evidence already evaluated by the Ombudsman and the appellate court, absent any showing of grave abuse. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Ombudsman’s dismissal was arrived at arbitrarily or through a misapprehension of facts, the Court deferred to its factual findings and conclusion that the evidence did not engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed.