GR 157877; (March, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 157877 March 10, 2006
COMMISSIONER ON HIGHER EDUCATION, Petitioner, vs. ROSA F. MERCADO, Respondent.
FACTS
Respondent Rosa F. Mercado, a CHED Senior Education Specialist, was initially found guilty of discourtesy in official duties and reprimanded. She moved for reconsideration, attaching a purported resolution by a former CHED Chairman and an affidavit of desistance from the complainant, Ma. Luisa Dimayuga. CHED discovered irregularities: no record of the resolution existed and Dimayuga’s signature on the affidavit was questionable. CHED then filed new charges against Mercado for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. After proceedings where Mercado did not participate, CHED dismissed her from service.
Mercado appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC initially affirmed the dismissal but later, upon Mercado’s motion for reconsideration, reversed itself and ordered her reinstatement with backwages. CHED filed a “Manifestation with Motion for Clarification” with the CSC, questioning the finality of the reversal and its right to seek reconsideration. Pending the CSC’s resolution of this motion and before the appeal period lapsed, CHED also sought and was granted an extension by the Court of Appeals to file a petition for review. CHED filed the petition within the extended period.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed CHED’s petition for review on the ground of prematurity for failure to first file a motion for reconsideration of the CSC’s reversal order.
RULING
No. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition. The Supreme Court clarified the procedural rules governing appeals from CSC decisions. Under Section 50, Rule III of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a party may elevate a CSC decision directly to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Crucially, this provision does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the CSC as a prerequisite. The rule explicitly states a party “may elevate,” which permits direct elevation.
The Court distinguished this from scenarios where a specific rule or law mandates a prior motion for reconsideration. Here, no such requirement exists for appeals from the CSC to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, CHED’s act of filing a “Manifestation with Motion for Clarification” did not constitute a mandatory motion for reconsideration that had to be resolved first. CHED’s direct recourse to the Court of Appeals via a timely petition for review, filed within the granted extension, was procedurally proper. The prematurity ruling was incorrect, and the appellate court should have decided the petition on its merits.