G.R. No. 157801; June 8, 2005
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON. LYNDON D. JUNTILLA, in his capacity as HOUSING AND LAND USE ARBITER of HLURB, Region VII, Cebu City, and TERESA C. AGUILARA, Respondents.

FACTS

Teresa Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) for a condominium unit. After paying a substantial sum and observing no significant construction progress near the delivery date, Aguilar demanded rescission and a refund. PPGI refused, prompting Aguilar to file a complaint with the HLURB. The HLURB ruled in Aguilar’s favor, ordering rescission, a refund with interest, and damages. This decision became final and executory. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied a condominium unit owned by PPGI in Makati. Despite a third-party claim, the unit was auctioned, with Aguilar as the highest bidder. After the redemption period lapsed, a final deed of sale was issued, and a new Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) was registered in Aguilar’s name.
Aguilar then filed a motion for a writ of possession with the HLURB. PPGI claimed it was not properly served with this motion, as it had moved offices. The HLURB granted the writ. PPGI filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, partly because the writ had already been enforced, placing Aguilar in physical possession. PPGI then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the HLURB did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of possession.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals. The issuance of the writ of possession was a ministerial duty following the consolidation of title in Aguilar’s favor. The core legal logic is that once a property is sold at an execution sale and the buyer obtains a certificate of title after the redemption period, the issuance of a writ of possession to place the buyer in physical possession becomes a ministerial act. The court or quasi-judicial body, like the HLURB, has no discretion to deny it. Aguilar’s title, evidenced by CCT No. 74777, was a result of a valid execution proceeding to satisfy a final judgment. PPGI’s arguments regarding improper service of the motion for the writ and claims questioning Aguilar’s ownership were unavailing. The alleged defect in service did not negate the ministerial nature of issuing the writ after title consolidation. Furthermore, challenging the validity of Aguilar’s title is a collateral attack, which is prohibited by law; a certificate of title can only be challenged in a direct proceeding. Therefore, the HLURB committed no grave abuse of discretion.