G.R. No. 157472; September 28, 2007
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner, vs. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy was charged with Homicide for shooting his commanding officer. The Information included the aggravating circumstance of “killing… in disregard of his rank.” After petitioner pleaded not guilty to Homicide, the respondent judge ordered the prosecutor to amend the Information to Murder, reasoning that the allegation of “disregard of rank” qualified the crime. The prosecutor complied by altering the caption and opening paragraph to “Murder” but left the accusatory body unchanged. When the case was called for pre-trial, petitioner objected to being re-arraigned for Murder, arguing double jeopardy, as his plea to the Homicide charge had already been entered.
The respondent judge initially denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Murder charge. However, upon reconsideration, the judge reversed himself, finding that “disregard of rank” is merely a generic aggravating circumstance, not a qualifying one, and thus reinstated the original Homicide Information. Unsatisfied, petitioner filed this certiorari petition, contending that the initial order to amend to Murder and the subsequent reinstatement of the Homicide charge both constituted grave abuse of discretion and placed him in double jeopardy.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in (1) ordering the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder after arraignment, and (2) subsequently reinstating the Homicide Information, thereby violating the rule against double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. On the first issue, the Court held that while the post-arraignment amendment to change the crime’s name from Homicide to Murder was a substantial amendment generally prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110, this error was rectified when the judge granted reconsideration and reinstated the original Homicide charge. The judge correctly recognized that “disregard of rank” under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code is a generic aggravating circumstance, not a qualifying circumstance that elevates Homicide to Murder. Qualifying circumstances must specifically affect the manner of commission of the crime, which “disregard of rank” does not.
On the double jeopardy claim, the Court ruled that the constitutional protection does not apply. For double jeopardy to attach, the first jeopardy must have validly terminated by a conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s consent. Here, there was no termination of the Homicide case. The proceedings were merely suspended due to the erroneous amendment and the subsequent motions. The reinstatement of the original Homicide Information meant the initial proceedings, including the plea, remained valid, and the case simply continued. Therefore, petitioner was not placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense. The respondent judge acted within his jurisdiction in correcting his own error to proceed with the proper charge.