G.R. No. 156684; April 6, 2011
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay owned a 1,044-square meter parcel of land in Mandaluyong City, half of which they used as their residence and the other half they rented to nine families. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, authorizing the City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps to expropriate the petitioners’ land for the purpose of developing a low-cost housing project for less privileged constituents. Alleging that the land was their only property and source of income, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) seeking to annul Resolution No. 552 as unconstitutional, confiscatory, and improper. The RTC initially dismissed the petition but, upon reconsideration, reversed itself and declared the resolution null and void. The City of Mandaluyong appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the RTC’s order and upheld Resolution No. 552. The CA’s decision and its subsequent denial of the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration prompted this appeal.

ISSUE

1. Whether the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition were proper remedies to assail Sanggunian Resolution No. 552.
2. Whether the validity of Resolution No. 552 can be assailed even before its implementation, or whether a property owner must await the takeover of possession before seeking judicial nullification.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals, albeit on different grounds.
1. Certiorari and prohibition were not proper remedies. The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is directed only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The Sangguniang Panglungsod, in enacting Resolution No. 552, was performing a legislative function. Legislative acts, such as the passage of a resolution authorizing expropriation proceedings, are not subject to certiorari. Similarly, prohibition lies only against judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial acts. The act of passing the resolution was not ministerial but legislative. Therefore, the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
2. The action was premature. Resolution No. 552 was merely an initial step—an authorization for the City Mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. It did not itself appropriate the petitioners’ property. The proper recourse for the petitioners was to await the filing of an expropriation complaint by the City and to raise their objections, including the propriety of the exercise of eminent domain and the issue of public use, within that special civil action for expropriation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. At that stage, the court can determine the necessity and propriety of the expropriation. A property owner need not wait for the actual takeover of possession to challenge an expropriation, but the challenge must be made in the context of the proper judicial proceeding, which is the expropriation case itself, not through a pre-emptive writ of certiorari against a legislative authorization.