G.R. No. 156482 September 17, 2008
PEDRO GABRIEL, FERNANDO JAMIAS, ALFREDO NIEDO, MABINI JAMIAS, BRAULIO TANGO, MARIANO ECHAVARI, ISIDRO RECITES, BERNARDO BAQUIRIN, FERMIN JAMIAS, FRANCISCO NIEDO, GAVINO JAMIAS, JULIANO ORBILLO, ROSENDO NIEDO, PACITA A. QUIÑO, JESUS CACHO, REICARDO TAGANAS, BERNARDO PECIO, CELESTINO NIEDO, FRANCISCO TUBERA, JUAN NIEDO, CONSOLACIO DINGAL, SOFRONIO NIEDO, ROSALINDA JAMIAS & DOMINGO PARSASO, Petitioners, versus MURMURAY JAMIAS, INANAMA JAMIAS DE LARA, LIWAWA JAMIAS DE LOS REYES, LANGIT JAMIAS, DALISAY JAMIAS & ISAGANI JAMIAS, Respondents.

FACTS

The case involves the “Jamias Estate,” a 36.5794-hectare rice land in Pangasinan originally owned by spouses Martin and Delfina Jamias. Upon Martin’s death in 1958, the property was inherited by his wife Delfina and their six children (the respondents). The estate was partitioned, and individual Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued to each heir in 1972. After Delfina’s death in 1980, the entire estate was placed under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to P.D. No. 27 in 1981, and the petitioners, identified as tenant-farmers, were issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs). The respondents filed a petition with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for exemption/retention of seven hectares each, claiming their individually titled lands were erroneously covered. During the pendency of this petition, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the petitioners in 1983, and land titles were personally distributed to them by President Corazon Aquino in 1987. On March 17, 1986, then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella granted the respondents’ petition for retention. This order was affirmed with modification by DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong on May 20, 1991, which directed, among other things, that the cancellation of the registered EPs covering the retained areas should be made before a proper court. The petitioners challenged these DAR orders via certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition. The Supreme Court denied the petitioners’ subsequent appeal, and the decision became final and executory on February 5, 1996. Following a DAR Regional Director’s Resolution on September 11, 1997, which directed the respondents to file an action with the DARAB for the cancellation of the EPs, the respondents filed separate petitions before the DARAB Regional Office. The DARAB Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of the respondents on June 21, 1999, ordering the cancellation of the petitioners’ EPs and the restoration of the respondents’ titles. The petitioners appealed to the DARAB Central Office, which dismissed their appeal on September 12, 2002. The petitioners then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed via a Resolution dated October 18, 2002, for failure to comply with procedural requirements, specifically the lack of a written explanation for resorting to personal service of the petition. Their motion for reconsideration was denied on December 17, 2002.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners’ petition for review for failure to comply with the procedural requirement under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which mandates a written explanation for resorting to a mode of service other than by registered mail.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s dismissal, ruling that the petitioners’ failure to provide a written explanation for choosing personal service over service by registered mail, as required by Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The Court emphasized that procedural rules are designed to facilitate the orderly administration of justice and are not to be disregarded. The petitioners’ argument that the requirement was merely directory was rejected, as the rule uses the mandatory word “shall.” Furthermore, the Court found that the petitioners’ subsequent filing of an explanation in their motion for reconsideration did not cure the defect, as compliance with the rule is required at the time of filing the petition. The Court also addressed the substantive issue, upholding the DARAB’s jurisdiction to cancel the Emancipation Patents. It ruled that the DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction, and cancellation of EPs or CLOAs registered with the Land Registration Authority. Since the EPs in question had already been registered, the DARAB properly exercised its jurisdiction. The Court noted that the final and executory DAR orders, which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court, established the respondents’ right to retention and the erroneous coverage of their land, providing a valid ground for the cancellation of the petitioners’ EPs under DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994.