G.R. No. 156336 August 31, 2006
PNB Credit Card Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Matilde M. Rodriguez, Respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner PNB Credit Card Corporation filed a collection complaint against respondent Matilde M. Rodriguez before the Makati RTC. On March 26, 1993, the trial court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of interest to prosecute. The records do not show that this order was served on the parties. On April 22, 1993, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, alleging it had just discovered delays in the service of summons. No copy was furnished to respondent.
Subsequently, on October 28, 1993, the trial court granted the motion and reinstated the case. Proceedings continued, leading to a default order against respondent. However, on February 22, 1995, the trial court issued a second order dismissing the case without prejudice for petitioner’s failure to present its evidence ex-parte. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied. The CA ruled that the March 26, 1993 dismissal order had already become final and executory, nullifying all subsequent proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s first order of dismissal dated March 26, 1993 had become final and executory, thereby rendering the reinstatement of the case and all subsequent proceedings null and void.

RULING

Yes, the first dismissal order became final and executory. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s decision. For a motion for reconsideration to toll the reglementary period for appeal or to prevent finality, it must comply with the three-day notice rule and be served upon the adverse party. Petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 22, 1993, was fatally defective as it was not furnished to respondent. Consequently, the motion did not interrupt the period for finality of the March 26, 1993 order.
Since the order was issued without prejudice, it became final after fifteen days from notice to petitioner. The Court rejected petitioner’s reliance on Medrano v. Court of Appeals, as the factual circumstances were distinct. In Medrano, the plaintiff had filed a motion to set the case for hearing before receiving the dismissal order, and the trial court subsequently granted multiple resettings, which the Court deemed an effective reconsideration. Here, no such affirmative acts by the trial court occurred before the order’s finality. Therefore, the trial court lost jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration and to reinstate the case. All proceedings following the October 28, 1993 reinstatement order were null and void. The petition was denied.