G.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEÑA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE, JR., Petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, Respondent.

FACTS

Respondent Wilson Go entered into a Contract to Sell with Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI), represented by its officers (petitioners), to purchase a subdivision lot. Go fully paid the purchase price. FEPI, however, failed to deliver the title or develop the property, citing a cease and desist order from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) due to disputes over land ownership under agrarian reform. Go filed a complaint for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the Revised Penal Code before the Pasig City Prosecutor, alleging FEPI misrepresented itself as the owner of the property at the time of sale. The City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, finding no misrepresentation as the contract did not explicitly state FEPI was the owner and noting the HLURB had jurisdiction over refund claims.
Go appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor and directed the filing of an information for estafa against petitioners. Petitioners then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, seeking to nullify the Secretary of Justice’s resolution. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that a petition for review under Rule 43 was an erroneous mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for review on the ground that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is not the proper remedy to assail a resolution of the Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that a resolution of the Secretary of Justice reversing a prosecutor’s finding is not appealable via a petition for review under Rule 43. Rule 43 applies to appeals from judgments or final orders of quasi-judicial agencies enumerated therein. The Secretary of Justice, when reviewing a prosecutor’s resolution, exercises executive authority and discretion in prosecuting crimes, not quasi-judicial functions. The proper recourse for an aggrieved party from such a resolution is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not an appeal, alleging grave abuse of discretion. Since petitioners erroneously availed of Rule 43, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed their petition. The Court emphasized that while the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause is generally not subject to judicial review, it may be assailed through certiorari if there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners’ failure to use the correct mode of appeal warranted the dismissal of their petition.