GR 155832; (December, 2010) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155832; December 7, 2010
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Imelda R. Marcos, Respondents.
FACTS
On March 13, 1986, Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Raul Daza authorized lawyers Jose Tan Ramirez and Ben Abella, as PCGG Region VIII Task Force Head and Co-Deputy, to sequester properties in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos and others. Acting on this authority, Ramirez and Abella issued a sequestration order on March 18, 1986, against the Marcoses’ Olot Resthouse property in Tolosa, Leyte. The Republic, through the PCGG, later filed a civil case for ill-gotten wealth recovery. In 2001, Marcos moved to quash the sequestration order, arguing it was void for lacking the signatures of at least two PCGG Commissioners as required by Section 3 of the subsequently enacted PCGG Rules and Regulations.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash, ruling the order was void for being issued by mere PCGG agents and not by the Commission itself. It ordered the property’s restoration to Marcos. The Republic filed a petition for certiorari, arguing the PCGG rules were not yet in effect at the time of sequestration and that Marcos was estopped from challenging the order.
ISSUE
Whether the March 18, 1986 sequestration order against the Olot Resthouse, issued by PCGG agents prior to the enactment of the PCGG rules, was validly issued.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s resolution. The sequestration order was void. The legal logic rests on the non-delegable nature of the PCGG’s quasi-judicial power to issue sequestration orders. Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution and the pertinent executive orders, a sequestration order may only issue upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are ill-gotten wealth. The power to make this prima facie determination is vested by law in the PCGG itself as an incident of its investigatory powers.
The Court, citing the precedent of Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Dio Island Resort, Inc.), held that this authority cannot be delegated to mere agents or representatives. The requirement for the signatures of at least two Commissioners, even if codified in rules issued after the fact, embodies the essential collegial and quasi-judicial character of this determination. Since Attys. Ramirez and Abella were not Commissioners, they had no authority to make the requisite prima facie finding or to issue a binding sequestration order. The defect was not cured by the later enactment of rules; the legal infirmity existed from issuance because the agents lacked the inherent statutory authority to act. The Republic’s failure to present evidence that the PCGG itself made a prior prima facie finding further doomed its case.