GR 155815; (July, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155815 ; July 14, 2004
KENNETH NGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Kenneth Ngo was charged with three counts of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). The charges stemmed from three postdated checks, each for P75,000.00, issued to Paul Gotianse in October 1988 as settlement for an indebtedness to Northern Hill Development Corporation. The checks were dishonored upon presentment for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Following the dishonor, notices and demands were sent to the petitioner. During trial, after the prosecution rested its case, Ngo filed a Motion to Dismiss, which the trial court treated as a demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court. The motion was denied, and Ngo was barred from presenting evidence. The trial court convicted him on all three counts.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming petitioner’s conviction for violation of B.P. 22.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the modified decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court emphasized that for a conviction under B.P. 22, the prosecution must only prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. The law creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds from the act of issuing a dishonored check.
The Court found that for two of the checks, all elements were proven by the prosecution’s unrebutted evidence, which established the issuance, dishonor, and receipt of notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s arguments—such as the nature of the underlying obligation, the alleged lack of consideration for the checks, and claims of civil compensation—were deemed irrelevant to the criminal charge, which is malum prohibitum. The offense is complete upon the issuance of a worthless check, irrespective of the purpose for which it was issued. However, the Court acquitted petitioner for the third check due to the prosecution’s failure to prove he received the requisite notice of dishonor for that specific instrument, which is a necessary element for the presumption of knowledge to arise. The penalties were modified in line with prevailing administrative circulars.