GR 155746; (October, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155746; October 13, 2004
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners are the registered owners of Lot 1029 in Cebu City. After a protracted legal battle culminating in a 1994 deed of absolute sale from the Province of Cebu, they obtained title and initiated ejectment proceedings against squatters occupying the lot. They secured a favorable judgment and a writ of demolition. However, the City Mayor requested a suspension of the demolition to find a relocation site. During this suspension, the Cebu City Sangguniang Panlungsod passed Ordinance No. 1843 on July 19, 2000, authorizing the expropriation of Lot 1029 for socialized housing, specifically for subdivision and sale to the current squatter occupants, and appropriating ₱6.88 million for its acquisition.
Petitioners filed an action to declare Ordinance No. 1843 unconstitutional, arguing the expropriation was not for “public use” but to benefit private individuals (the squatters) for political purposes. The Regional Trial Court upheld the ordinance’s validity, prompting this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether Ordinance No. 1843, authorizing the expropriation of petitioners’ property for the purpose of subdividing and selling it to the current squatter occupants, constitutes a valid exercise of eminent domain for “public use” under the Constitution and applicable laws.
RULING
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition and declared Ordinance No. 1843 unconstitutional and invalid. The Court held that the expropriation failed the “public use” requirement. While the power of eminent domain delegated to local government units under the Local Government Code can be exercised for public welfare, including socialized housing, the purpose must be genuine and direct. The ordinance targeted a specific, small parcel of land already owned by petitioners and earmarked it for transfer to a determinate group of private individuals—the very squatters unlawfully occupying it. This constituted a direct benefit to private parties, not a public use. The Court emphasized that the taking of private property is a severe derogation of constitutional rights, requiring the most scrutinizing judicial review. The ordinance was an arbitrary and politically expedient measure that circumvented the final ejectment judgment in favor of petitioners. The City’s failure to make a prior valid and definite offer to purchase the property, as required by Section 19 of the Local Government Code, further rendered the ordinance defective. The expropriation was not part of a coherent, area-wide socialized housing program but an isolated act favoring specific individuals, violating the due process and equal protection clauses.