GR 155392; (December, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155392 ; December 6, 2006
ERLINDA GUANZON, petitioner, vs. ANDREW P. ARRADAZA, FRANCISCA MAIDIN and ERLINDA LEBITA, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Andrew Arradaza filed a complaint for damages against several defendants, including petitioner Erlinda Guanzon, the registered owner of a dump truck involved in a vehicular collision with a jeepney in which Arradaza was a passenger. The Amended Complaint alleged negligence on the part of both drivers. After failed attempts at personal service, summons and a copy of the amended complaint were served upon Guanzon through substituted service at her business address, delivered to a certain Susan Ador. Guanzon failed to file an Answer and was declared in default by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) on July 12, 1996.
Almost two years later, on July 9, 1998, Guanzon filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person due to defective service of summons. The MeTC denied the motion and, after trial, rendered a judgment holding Guanzon jointly and severally liable with other defendants for damages. This decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the substituted service of summons on petitioner Guanzon and the consequent jurisdiction of the trial court over her person.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Court held that the substituted service of summons was valid. The sheriff’s return indicated that personal service could not be effected within a reasonable time, thereby justifying substituted service under the Rules of Court. Service was made at Guanzon’s regular place of business, which was proper, and was received by a person who appeared to be in charge. The constitutional requirement of due process is satisfied when service is reasonably calculated to provide notice.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that Guanzon’s procedural recourse was improper. A party declared in default has specific remedies, such as a motion to set aside the order of default or a petition for relief from judgment. Guanzon did not avail herself of these remedies. Instead, she belatedly filed a Motion to Dismiss nearly two years after the default order, which was an incorrect remedy. Her failure to timely challenge the default order and her subsequent participation in the proceedings through her appeal on the merits effectively estopped her from questioning the court’s jurisdiction over her person. The trial court validly acquired jurisdiction.