GR 155344; (January, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 155344; January 20, 2004
Rolando N. Canet, Petitioner, vs. Mayor Julieta A. Decena, Respondent.
FACTS
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, passed Resolution No. 049, Series of 1998, authorizing petitioner Rolando N. Canet to establish and operate a cockpit. Subsequently, it passed Ordinance No. 001, Series of 1999, to regulate cockpits and related activities. Respondent Mayor Julieta A. Decena returned the ordinance for lacking rules on cockfighting and a separability clause, prompting the Sangguniang Bayan to withdraw it indefinitely via Resolution No. 078, Series of 1999.
Relying on Resolution No. 049, Canet applied for a mayor’s permit to operate the cockpit. Mayor Decena denied the application, citing the Local Government Code, which vests the authority to license cockpits specifically in the Sangguniang Bayan through an ordinance. Canet filed a mandamus action with the Regional Trial Court, which issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the mayor to issue the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, annulling the writ.
ISSUE
Whether the municipal mayor can be compelled to issue a business permit for a cockpit absent a specific municipal ordinance authorizing such issuance.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, ruling that the mayor cannot be compelled to issue the permit. The legal logic is anchored on Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which explicitly grants the Sangguniang Bayan the legislative authority to “authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits.” This power must be exercised through an ordinance. The Sangguniang Bayan’s Resolution No. 049, being merely a resolution, cannot substitute for an ordinance as it lacks the force and permanence of law required to establish the regulatory framework, including the imposition of necessary fees. The subsequent Ordinance No. 001, which would have provided this framework, was validly withdrawn, leaving no operative law to implement. General municipal tax ordinances cited by petitioner do not specifically prescribe fees for cockpits and cannot fill this void. To compel the mayor to act without an enabling ordinance would violate the clear statutory delineation of powers. Furthermore, laws authorizing gambling activities like cockfighting must be strictly construed, and any doubt must be resolved to limit, not expand, such franchises. Thus, absent the requisite ordinance, the mayor correctly denied the permit application.
