G.R. No. 154190. October 17, 2005.
MIAA-NAIA ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE OPERATORS, Petitioner, vs. THE OMBUDSMAN, PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, ET AL., Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner MIAA-NAIA Association of Service Operators filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the Ombudsman against various public officials and private individuals. The complaint alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct for Public Officials, and the Plunder Law. The allegations centered on the execution of the 1997 Concession Agreement and subsequent Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) and Supplements between the government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the NAIA Terminal 3 project. Petitioner claimed these agreements contained onerous and monopolistic provisions that would prejudice its members, who were existing service providers at NAIA. A supplemental complaint also alleged overpricing in a demolition contract and charged a witness with perjury for recanting his initial affidavit.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman’s Joint Resolution found no evidence to support the charges and effectively treated the PIATCO agreements as valid. Petitioner then filed this petition for certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE

Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause?

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court found that the Ombudsman’s dismissal was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the Court’s prior ruling in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., which had already declared the very same PIATCO agreements null and void. The Ombudsman’s resolution, by finding no probable cause, implicitly rested on the premise that the underlying contracts were valid—a premise directly contrary to the final and binding judgment in Agan.
This fundamental error rendered the Ombudsman’s exercise of judgment capricious and whimsical. Since the foundational agreements were void, the Ombudsman was required to re-evaluate whether the acts allegedly committed by the respondents in pursuance of those void contracts could constitute probable cause for the charged offenses. The Court also noted concerns about the completeness and haste of the preliminary investigation. Consequently, the Court set aside the Ombudsman’s Joint Resolution and directed the Ombudsman to conduct a new preliminary investigation with dispatch.