GR 154182; (December, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 154182, December 17, 2004
EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioners Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves, were charged with violating Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Information specifically alleged that Mayor Teves, in conspiracy with his wife, willfully caused the issuance of a business permit/license for the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of Daniel Teves, despite having a direct financial interest in the said cockpit, which was allegedly owned and operated by the spouses. After the prosecution presented its documentary evidence, the petitioners opted not to present their own evidence.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed reversible error in convicting the petitioners of possessing a prohibited pecuniary interest under the Local Government Code, a charge not explicitly alleged in the Information, thereby violating their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Sandiganbayan’s decision and acquitted the petitioners. The Court held that the conviction violated the petitioners’ constitutional right to be informed of the accusation. The Information exclusively charged them with the specific act of unlawfully intervening in the issuance of a permit for a business in which they had an interest. However, the Sandiganbayan, while absolving them of that specific act, convicted them based on the mere possession of a pecuniary interest prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Court ruled that the offense of which they were convicted is distinct from the offense for which they were charged. The “variance doctrine,” which allows conviction for a crime proved that is different from but included in the crime charged, does not apply. The crime of unlawful intervention under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is not legally inclusive of the separate offense of possessing a prohibited interest under the Local Government Code. The elements differ: unlawful intervention requires a positive act of participation, while mere possession is a status or condition. Since the Information did not allege the essential elements of the latter offense, the petitioners could not be validly convicted thereof. They were never arraigned or tried for that specific charge, depriving them of the opportunity to mount a proper defense.
