G.R. No. 153923 ; October 2, 2009
Spouses TOMAS F. GOMEZ and ADELAIDA S. GOMEZ, substituted by children TOMAS S. GOMEZ, II and GINA GOMEZ-LUKBAN, Petitioners, vs. GREGORIO CORREA and PHILIPPINE REALTY CORP., Respondents.

FACTS

The dispute originated from a 1951 Contract to Sell for a lot in Caloocan City. Benedicta Mangahas acquired the lot from Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) and later transferred half of her rights to Magdalena Madrid, who then assigned them to Adelaida Gomez. Benedicta sold her remaining half to Gregorio Correa in 1954. The Spouses Gomez advanced payments to PRC covering the entire lot, including Benedicta’s half. In 1956, they sued to rescind the sale to Correa. The trial court dismissed their complaint but ordered Correa to reimburse them for the payments made on his predecessor’s share. This decision was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals in 1977, directing the computation of legal interest on the reimbursement. The Supreme Court denied the Gomez spouses’ appeal in 1978, and the judgment became final.
Over five years after finality, Correa filed a motion to compute the interest. The trial court denied it, ruling execution by motion was no longer available. Correa then filed a new complaint in 1984 for specific performance and partition. The Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, ordering PRC to deliver a deed of sale for his half upon subdivision. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of the 1984 complaint for specific performance and partition constituted a revival of the final 1978 judgment, and whether attorney’s fees were correctly awarded.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate court. The 1984 complaint was not a mere revival of the previous judgment but an independent action to enforce Correa’s rights as a co-owner, which were recognized and established by the final 1978 decision. The legal logic is that a final judgment conclusively determines the rights of the parties. Here, the 1978 resolution settled that Correa was the rightful owner of one-half of the property, liable only to reimburse the Gomez spouses for certain advances. The subsequent action sought to give effect to that declared status of co-ownership through the physical partition of the property and the delivery of the corresponding title, remedies not encompassed by the simple money judgment in the earlier case. Thus, it was not barred by the five-year period for execution by motion under Rule 39.
However, the Court deleted the award of attorney’s fees. The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages in the absence of stipulation or except under specific statutory grounds. The appellate court’s award was based on the Gomez spouses’ refusal to subdivide, but the records showed they were merely insisting on full payment of the judgment debt as a precondition. This did not constitute gross and evident bad faith warranting an award of attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.