G.R. No. 153828; October 24, 2003
LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D. VILLARIN, respondents.

FACTS

The controversy originated from an HLURB decision ordering PR Builders, Inc. and its managers, including Pablito Villarin, to refund petitioner Lincoln Yao. To enforce the writ of execution, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in the names of spouses Pablito and Bernadine Villarin. Bernadine Villarin, the private respondent, filed a petition for prohibition before the RTC to enjoin the auction, alleging she co-owned the property under a regime of complete separation of property as decreed by a court, and she was not a party to the HLURB case. The RTC granted the petition, declaring the property exempt from execution.
Subsequently, petitioner Yao filed a motion for intervention in the prohibition case. The RTC denied this motion, ruling it was filed too late as the case had already been decided. Aggrieved, Yao filed this petition for certiorari, assailing the RTC’s declaration exempting the property from execution and the denial of his motion for intervention.

ISSUE

Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) declaring the subject co-owned property exempt from execution for the husband’s separate debt, and (2) denying petitioner’s motion for intervention.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. On the first issue, the Court upheld the exemption from execution. A fundamental principle is that execution can only reach properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The levied property was co-owned by Bernadine Villarin, a stranger to the HLURB case. The spouses’ property regime was governed by complete separation of property per a court order. Under Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code, separate properties are not liable for the personal debts of a spouse unless incurred for family expenses, which was not shown here. Thus, the sheriff exceeded his authority in levying the property, and prohibition was the proper remedy.
On the second issue, the Court ruled the denial of intervention was proper. Petitioner claimed he was an indispensable party in the prohibition case. However, Section 2, Rule 65 on prohibition does not require impleading a private party. Furthermore, intervention is allowed only before judgment rendition. Petitioner filed his motion over a month after the RTC’s resolution granting the petition, which had already become final. His right as a judgment creditor was not adversely affected, as other properties exclusively owned by the debtors were available for levy. Finally, petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s resolution was fatal to his certiorari petition. No arbitrariness or despotism constituting grave abuse of discretion was found.