GR 153652; (January, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 153652; January 16, 2004
ALFREDO YASAY DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. SPS. JOSE E. MANUEL and CONCORDIA MANUEL, represented by Attorney-in-fact, PATRICIA ARIOLA, respondents.
FACTS
Respondents, the registered owners of a lot in San Mateo, Rizal, allowed petitioner to occupy the property and build a temporary shelter after his house was destroyed by a typhoon. Petitioner, however, constructed a concrete house without their consent. In 1992, respondents demanded that petitioner vacate the lot. After failed barangay conciliation, they filed an unlawful detainer complaint in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in 1999. Petitioner claimed in his answer that respondents had verbally agreed to sell him a portion of the lot in 1995, and that he had made a purchase offer, which respondents countered by offering to sell the entire property.
The MTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering petitioner to vacate and pay reasonable compensation. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed this decision on appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which dismissed it for being filed out of time, noting that a prohibited second motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period.
ISSUE
The core issues are: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment case; and (2) whether petitioner is a builder in good faith entitled to rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition. On jurisdiction, the Court clarified that prior physical possession is not a requisite in an unlawful detainer case, distinguishing it from forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the cause of action is the unlawful withholding of possession after the termination of one’s right, such as by expiration or demand. The complaint sufficiently alleged that petitioner’s possession was by mere tolerance, which became unlawful upon respondents’ demand to vacate. Thus, the MTC correctly exercised jurisdiction.
On the second issue, the Court ruled petitioner is not a builder in good faith. Possession by mere tolerance is necessarily in bad faith because the occupant is aware that his stay is precarious and may be terminated at any time by the lawful owner. Since petitioner occupied the land only by respondents’ tolerance, he cannot claim the status of a builder in good faith or invoke Article 448, which applies only to builders who construct on land in the belief of ownership. The CA’s dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time was proper, as the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.