G.R. No. 153483; February 14, 2003
Flordeliza F. Querijero, petitioner, vs. The People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Flordeliza F. Querijero, the Cashier of the Integrated Provincial Health Office in Lucena City, was charged with malversation of public funds. An audit team discovered a shortage of ₱165,722.78 in her accountabilities, consisting of undeposited collections, unaccounted GSIS/SSS checks, and unliquidated cash advances. The audit was conducted in her absence, as she had been on sick leave and did not report for work. The safe was opened without her, and she failed to restitute the amount or provide a written explanation upon demand.
The defense presented witnesses, including petitioner, who argued that the audit was irregular. She claimed the reported checks for provincial aid had already been deposited and recorded. She further asserted that the GSIS/SSS checks were under the responsibility of Acting Collection Officer Ofelia Villapando, and that the cash advances were either for legitimate expenses in process or had already been paid. Testimonies indicated Villapando handled specific collections and deposits, and that petitioner’s safe was opened while Villapando’s was not.

ISSUE

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds based on prima facie evidence arising from her failure to account for the shortage upon demand.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted petitioner. The legal logic centers on the proper application of the prima facie evidence rule under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. This presumption arises only when an accountable officer fails to have public funds forthcoming upon demand by a duly authorized officer. For the presumption to apply, the demand must be made upon the officer who is accountable and chargeable for the specific funds.
The Court found that the audit team’s letters demanding an explanation and restitution were sent to petitioner after she had already been considered separated from the service as of July 8, 1986. Crucially, the audit and the demand covered funds and transactions for the period up to July 9, 1986. Since petitioner was no longer a public officer accountable for those funds at the time the demand was made, the essential element for the presumption of malversation was absent. The prosecution’s case, which heavily relied on this presumption, therefore collapsed. Without the presumption, the prosecution failed to prove petitioner’s criminal intent or gross negligence beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence suggesting other personnel had custody over some items further weakened the case for her exclusive accountability. Consequently, her guilt was not established with moral certainty.