GR 152997; (November, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 152997. November 10, 2004.
SALVADOR MARZALADO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr. was convicted of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code. The complainant, Cristina Albano, was the lessee of a unit owned by Marzalado’s mother. An ejectment case was pending against Albano, and the unit’s electricity had been disconnected. Albano alleged that on November 2, 1993, Marzalado forcibly opened her unit, removed her belongings, and changed the padlock, preventing her entry. Her witness, Narciso Raniedo, corroborated seeing Marzalado take items on that date.
For his defense, Marzalado claimed Albano had already vacated the premises. He testified that on November 3, 1993, he discovered water flowing from the unit. Unable to locate Albano, he reported it to barangay officials and, accompanied by two barangay tanods, entered the unit to stop the flooding. He asserted his entry was justified to prevent property damage and was not the unlawful entry alleged in the Information, which specified November 2, 1993.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Marzalado’s conviction for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling.
RULING
The Supreme Court REVERSED the conviction and ACQUITTED Marzalado. The legal logic hinges on the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the specific act charged. The Information alleged the trespass occurred on “November 2, 1993.” The prosecution’s evidence, including the testimony of Raniedo, was anchored on events of that date. However, Marzalado’s defense presented a different narrative for November 3, 1993, involving entry to address an emergency with barangay accompaniment.
The Court found that the variance between the date alleged and the date proved was material. While the precise date is not always a crucial element, it becomes so when it forms an integral part of the defense, as it did here. Marzalado’s defense of justified entry under Article 280 (to prevent serious harm to property) was specifically tied to November 3. The prosecution did not successfully rebut this defense or prove that the justified entry on November 3 was the same culpable act allegedly committed on November 2. Consequently, reasonable doubt existed as to whether the entry, if it occurred on November 3 as claimed, was unlawful. The prosecution thus failed to establish all elements of the crime for the incident charged, warranting acquittal.