GR 152072; (July, 2007) (Digest)
G.R. No. 152072 & G.R. No. 152104 July 12, 2007
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners, vs. ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., et al., Respondents. x—————————————x ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., et al., Petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Respondents.
FACTS
The Supreme Court promulgated a Decision on January 31, 2006, in consolidated cases involving petitioners Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, ordering them, among others, to return a sum of money to respondents Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court denied with finality in a Resolution dated March 27, 2006. Subsequently, they filed several other motions, including an “Urgent and Compelling Motion for Reconsideration,” all of which were noted or denied by the Court.
Following these denials, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas wrote a letter dated September 13, 2006, addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the ponente of the assailed Decision, with copies furnished to the Chief Justice and all other Associate Justices. In his letter, Roxas used intemperate and disrespectful language, intimating that Justice Nazario decided the case based on “considerations other than the pure merits” and called the Supreme Court a “dispenser of injustice.” He further expressed that his reverence for the Court had been “irreversibly eroded.”
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is guilty of indirect contempt of court and liable for disciplinary action for his derogatory and disrespectful statements against a Member of the Supreme Court and the Court as an institution.
RULING
Yes, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas is guilty of indirect contempt. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer owes fidelity to his client’s cause, his duty to the court as an officer of the judicial system is paramount. The language used in Roxas’s letter, accusing the ponente of bias and labeling the Court a “dispenser of injustice,” constitutes an attack on the integrity and dignity of the Court. Such statements, made after the Court had denied his motions with finality, clearly exceed the bounds of fair and respectful criticism.
The legal logic rests on the principle that the power to punish for contempt is essential to preserve the authority and proper administration of justice. Freedom of speech does not protect scurrilous attacks that undermine public confidence in the judiciary. The Court distinguished between a lawyer’s right to vigorously advocate and the duty to maintain a respectful tone, especially when addressing the Court. By suggesting improper motives and declaring a loss of reverence for the institution, Roxas’s actions tended to impede, obstruct, and degrade the administration of justice. The Court found him guilty of indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for improper conduct tending to bring the authority of the court into disrespect. He was fined โฑ30,000.00, warned against repetition, and a copy of the resolution was ordered attached to his personal record.
