GR 151037; (June, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 151037; June 23, 2005
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. TROY FRANCIS L. MONASTERIO, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) entered into an Exclusive Warehouse Agreement (EWA) with SMB Warehousing Services, represented by respondent Troy Francis L. Monasterio. The EWA contained a stipulation that any court action to enforce the agreement must be filed in the courts of Makati or Pasig, Metro Manila. Subsequently, respondent Monasterio, a resident of Naga City, filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City. He claimed unpaid cashiering fees for services allegedly rendered separately from the warehousing duties under the EWA.
SMC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, invoking the exclusive venue clause in the EWA. Monasterio opposed, arguing his cashiering claim was independent of the EWA. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling the cashiering services constituted a separate contract not covered by the EWA’s venue stipulation. SMC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). During its pendency, Monasterio filed an Amended Complaint, and SMC filed an Answer ex abundanti cautela.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC of Naga City erred in denying SMC’s motion to dismiss based on improper venue.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC of Naga City did not err. The legal logic hinges on the principle that a stipulation on venue applies only to actions arising from or connected with the contract in which it is contained. The Court examined the nature of Monasterio’s claim. His complaint sought payment for cashiering services—tasks involving handling millions in cash and checks and assuming risks of theft—which were not among the warehousing, storage, or related services enumerated in the EWA. The EWA’s subject matter was clearly limited to physical logistics for SMC’s products.
Since the claim for cashiering fees was based on a separate oral agreement for distinct financial services, it did not involve the enforcement of rights, duties, or terms under the EWA. Consequently, the exclusive venue clause in paragraph 26(b) of the EWA was inapplicable. With the stipulation not governing the action, the general rule on venue for personal actions under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court applied. Therefore, Monasterio, as the plaintiff, correctly filed the suit in Naga City, his place of residence. The RTC’s denial of the motion to dismiss was proper.