G.R. No. 150060; August 19, 2003
PRIMARY STRUCTURES CORP., represented by ENGR. WILLIAM C. LIU, Petitioner, vs. SPS. ANTHONY S. VALENCIA and SUSAN T. VALENCIA, Respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Primary Structures Corp. is the registered owner of a rural lot in Liloan, Cebu. Adjacent to its property were three other rural lots (Lots 4527, 4528, and 4529) with a combined area of 3,751 square meters, which were sold by Hermogenes Mendoza to respondent spouses in December 1994. Petitioner learned of the sale only in January 1996 when Mendoza sold it another adjacent lot. On January 30, 1996, petitioner sent a letter to respondents signifying its intent to redeem the three lots, followed by a tender of payment on May 30, 1996. Respondents refused.
Petitioner filed an action to compel legal redemption under Articles 1621 and 1623 of the Civil Code, claiming it never received the written notice of sale required by law. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that a statement in the deed of sale attesting to compliance with Article 1623 sufficed as the required notice and that petitioner failed to prove respondents owned no other rural land—a condition to defeat the right.

ISSUE

The core issues are: (1) whether the right of legal redemption under Article 1621 applies, and (2) whether the written notice requirement under Article 1623 was satisfied.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals. On the first issue, the right of legal redemption under Article 1621 was applicable. The lots were rural, and the area sold did not exceed one hectare. The Court noted respondents did not dispute the rural character of the lands on appeal and, critically, failed to prove they owned no other rural land—the burden for invoking the exemption under Article 1621 rested on them as grantees.
On the second issue, the Court ruled the mandatory written notice under Article 1623 was not complied with. The affidavit in the deed of sale, prepared only by the vendor and vendee, could not bind petitioner, a non-party. Citing Verdad v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized the written notice is indispensable to start the 30-day redemption period, and actual knowledge does not substitute for it except in peculiar circumstances not present here. Since no proper notice was given, the redemption period had not commenced. Petitioner’s action, filed within thirty days from its discovery of the sale, was thus timely. The Court granted petitioner a fresh 30-day period from the finality of its decision to exercise the right of redemption.