GR 149788; (May, 2006) (Digest)
G.R. No. 149788 ; May 31, 2006
Romeo Julag-Ay, Petitioner, vs. The Estate of Felimon Buenaventura, Sr., as represented by its sole heir Teresita Rosalinda B. Mariano, Respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Romeo Julag-Ay leased a property in Muntinlupa City. The title was in the name of “Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, married to Felimon Buenaventura.” Julag-Ay paid rent first to Felimon Buenaventura, Sr., then to his son Felimon Jr. after the father’s death in 1996. Julag-Ay defaulted on his rent payments for the year 1998. After Felimon Jr.’s death in December 1998, respondent Teresita Mariano, as administratrix and heir of the Estate of Felimon Buenaventura, Sr., assumed administration. Julag-Ay paid rent for January and February 1999 to Teresita but then stopped. After conciliation failed, Teresita filed an ejectment case.
Julag-Ay contested the suit, arguing Teresita lacked legal personality as the property belonged to the Estate of Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, administered by Resurreccion Bihis, to whom he claimed he had paid rent. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the complaint, agreeing that Teresita was not a real party-in-interest. The Regional Trial Court reversed, ruling Teresita had a better right to possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether respondent Teresita Mariano has the legal personality to institute the ejectment case against petitioner Julag-Ay.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision. In an ejectment suit, the principal issue is physical or material possession, not ownership. The plaintiff need only prove a better right to possess. Teresita, as the administratrix of the Estate of Felimon Buenaventura, Sr., established this better right. The Court found that the property was owned in common by the spouses Felimon and Felisa, making Felimon’s estate a co-owner. As administratrix, Teresita could rightfully seek to eject a lessee who had defaulted on rent.
Crucially, the Court applied the principle of estoppel against Julag-Ay under Article 1436 of the Civil Code. By paying rent successively to Felimon Sr., Felimon Jr., and finally to Teresita for two months in 1999, and by promising her during conciliation to settle his arrears, Julag-Ay recognized the lessor’s title and Teresita’s authority to collect rent. He is estopped from later denying that authority. His defense of payment to a different administrator, Resurreccion Bihis, was unavailing as he failed to implead her or that estate to substantiate his claim. His possession became unlawful upon his default in 1998, which a subsequent payment to another party could not cure.