GR 149590; (January, 2005) (Digest)
G.R. No. 149590; January 12, 2005
SOUTHECH DEVELOPMENT CORP. and/or REMCOR and RICARDO LU, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division), RODRIGO LAPEZ, SR. and REYNALDO GAMUTAN, respondents.
FACTS
Respondents Rodrigo Lapez, Sr. and Reynaldo Gamutan, machine operators for petitioner Southech Development Corporation, were suspended for one month in September 1999 following an insubordination charge. Petitioners alleged that respondents refused to acknowledge the suspension notice and ignored a directive to report to the company president’s house for discussion. Instead, respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the illegal dismissal claim, ruling that no termination act was shown and it was respondents who severed employment by refusing the meeting. The Arbiter, however, awarded respondents 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Respondents’ counsel, the Cabellero Aumentado Montes Law Office, received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision on July 14, 2000. Counsel Atty. Amado Auditor Caballero averred he was in Bohol attending to cases and only personally received the decision on September 8, 2000. On September 12, 2000, the 60th day from the law office’s receipt, respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for being filed beyond the mandatory 10-calendar day period. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC, applying liberal construction of procedural rules in labor cases to prevent detriment to workers.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the NLRC’s dismissal of respondents’ belated appeal.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the NLRC resolution dismissing the appeal. The perfection of an appeal within the prescribed period is mandatory and jurisdictional. While the Court has recognized exceptions to excuse tardiness, such as counsel’s reliance on a misleading notice, substantial justice, prevention of miscarriage of justice, or special circumstances combined with legal merits, none apply here.
The excuse proffered by respondents’ counsel—that he was in his home province when the decision was received at the law office—is unacceptable. Receipt of the decision by the counsel’s law office bound the clients. The negligence of counsel in timely filing the appeal is generally imputed to the client. The rule that client is bound by counsel’s negligence may be relaxed only in exceptional cases, such as where it would result in outright deprivation of liberty or property, or where the interests of justice compellingly require. Respondents failed to demonstrate any such exceptional circumstance justifying relaxation. The uncontroverted facts of the case did not incline in favor of excusing the procedural lapse.