G.R. No. 149261 , December 15, 2010
AZUCENA B. CORPUZ, PETITIONER, VS. ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. del Rosario filed an affidavit-complaint for libel against his colleague, Assistant Solicitor General Azucena B. Corpuz, with the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. The complaint alleged that Corpuz’s June 13, 1997 memorandum, which stated “there is no such thing as ‘palabra de honor’ as far as ASG del Rosario is concerned,” was maliciously issued to discredit him. The memorandum was addressed to the Solicitor General and all Assistant Solicitors General. After preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor found probable cause for libel, noting the statement was defamatory, malice was presumed, and its publication to other officers indicated lack of good intention.
The City Prosecutor approved the resolution and filed an Information for libel. Corpuz’s appeals to the National Capital Regional Prosecutor and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary were denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing the prosecutors gravely abused their discretion. The CA denied the petition, ruling she failed to show exceptional circumstances for certiorari and that her defenses were evidentiary matters for trial.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the public prosecutors did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict petitioner for libel.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA Decision. The Court reiterated that the determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation is an executive function vested in the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. Judicial review via certiorari is limited to determining whether there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court found no such abuse.
The prosecutors’ finding of probable cause was supported by evidence on record: the memorandum contained a defamatory imputation, malice was presumed from its content, and it was unduly published to other officers. Petitioner’s contention that the memorandum was a privileged communication made in the performance of a legal or moral duty under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is a matter of defense. This requires an examination of evidence best undertaken during a full trial on the merits, not at the preliminary investigation stage. The preliminary investigation is not the venue for the full and exhaustive presentation of a party’s defense. The Court emphasized that an accusation is not synonymous with guilt, and the trial court is the proper forum to hear evidence on the privileged nature of the communication and the presence or absence of actual malice.