G.R. Nos. 148712-15; January 21, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINADOR CACHOLA y SALAZAR, ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA, NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA, appellants.

FACTS

On December 28, 1999, multiple murders occurred in Bauang, La Union, resulting in the deaths of Carmelita Barnachea, Felix Barnachea Jr., Victorino Lolarga, and Rubenson Abance. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on the eyewitness account of 12-year-old Jessie Barnachea, who was present during the attack. Jessie testified that two armed men entered his home, struck him, and proceeded to shoot the victims. He identified appellants Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the assailants. Corroborative testimony from neighbors established that the perpetrators used a distinct jeep with “El Shaddai” and “fruits and vegetables dealer” markings, which was seen fleeing the scene.
A police checkpoint later intercepted a jeep matching this description. All eight appellants were on board. Jessie subsequently identified Cachola and Amay in a police line-up and via photographs. Paraffin tests yielded positive results for gunpowder nitrates only on the right hands of Cachola and Amay. The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence without prior leave of court. The trial court denied it, convicted Cachola and Amay as principals, and convicted the other six appellants as accomplices, all for four counts of murder.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) the validity of the conviction based on the eyewitness identification and circumstantial evidence; (2) the correctness of the trial court’s denial of the Demurrer to Evidence filed without leave; and (3) the proper criminal liability of all appellants.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay but acquitted the six other appellants. The Court found the testimony of child witness Jessie Barnachea credible, consistent, and given in a straightforward manner. His positive identification of Cachola and Amay was corroborated by their timely apprehension in the uniquely described getaway vehicle and the positive paraffin findings. This combination of direct and circumstantial evidence established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for four counts of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by dwelling.
However, the Court acquitted appellants Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria. The evidence merely placed them in the intercepted jeep. Mere presence, without proof of prior conspiracy or conscious assistance in the execution of the crime, is insufficient to establish criminal liability as accomplices. The prosecution failed to prove any act of cooperation or participation from these six appellants before or during the killings.
Regarding procedure, the trial court correctly denied the Demurrer to Evidence filed without prior leave, as the right to present evidence was thereby waived. Consequently, the Supreme Court modified the trial court’s decision, imposing reclusion perpetua instead of the death penalty for Cachola and Amay due to the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, and ordering the immediate release of the six acquitted appellants.