GR 148602; (August, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 148602 ; August 12, 2004
FEDERICO B. DIAMANTE III, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, & THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Federico B. Diamante III, the Municipal Mayor of Palo, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Information alleged that he unlawfully terminated Ma. Corina Antonnette M. Ilagan, a Budgeting Aide, and continually refused to reinstate her despite favorable Civil Service Commission (CSC) resolutions, causing her undue injury. After posting bail in the Regional Trial Court, the petitioner reinstated Ilagan with backwages via a memorandum.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan, arguing that with the complainant’s reinstatement and full payment of monetary claims, the element of “undue injury” was absent, negating the crime. He also claimed good faith. The Sandiganbayan initially denied the motion due to lack of jurisdiction over his person, as his bail bond had not been transmitted. After filing a motion to revive, which was set for hearing slightly beyond the reglementary period, the Sandiganbayan, while finding the motion meritorious in substance, denied it for being filed out of time. It later denied reconsideration, ruling that the issues raised were matters of defense best resolved in a full-blown trial.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed reversible error in denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reinvestigation.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the Motion for Reinvestigation. The Court clarified that the grounds raised by the petitioner—specifically, the absence of undue injury due to subsequent reinstatement and payment, and his claim of good faith—are indeed substantive matters of defense that involve complex factual and legal issues. These issues require a judicial determination on whether undue injury was suffered during the period of obstinate refusal to comply with the CSC orders prior to the filing of the Information, and whether such post-facto restitution extinguishes criminal liability.
The Court agreed with the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Special Prosecutor that these are not mere technicalities for a reinvestigation but are proper for litigation. However, the Court noted that a full-blown trial may not be strictly necessary, as the evidence appears largely documentary. The issues could be effectively narrowed and resolved during pre-trial or through appropriate judicial proceedings. Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not err in directing that these defenses be properly ventilated before the court instead of through a reinvestigation.
