GR 148595; (July, 2004) (Digest)
G.R. No. 148595. July 12, 2004.
SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, petitioners, vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners obtained a loan from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) secured by a real estate mortgage. Upon default, Metrobank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, and the property was sold at public auction to Metrobank as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was registered on January 27, 1998. Within the one-year redemption period, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial sale (Civil Case No. MAN-3454), alleging that Metrobank bloated the obligation with excessive charges to frustrate redemption. They prayed for the nullification of the foreclosure or, alternatively, to be allowed to redeem based on the correct obligation.
After the redemption period expired without redemption, Metrobank consolidated its ownership and obtained a new title. It then filed a Petition for a Writ of Possession. Petitioners opposed, arguing that the pending annulment case constituted a prejudicial question that should suspend the possession proceedings, citing Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court. They contended that filing the annulment complaint was equivalent to an offer to redeem.
ISSUE
Whether the pendency of an action for annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale bars the issuance of a writ of possession to the purchaser after the redemption period has lapsed.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale after the lapse of the redemption period and consolidation of title is a ministerial duty of the court. The pendency of a separate action questioning the validity of the foreclosure does not impede this ministerial function. The right to possession springs from the purchaser’s consolidated ownership, which becomes absolute upon no redemption being made.
The Court distinguished the cited case of Belisario, which involved an action to enforce redemption filed within the redemption period. In contrast, petitioners’ action was for annulment of the sale, which is not equivalent to an offer to redeem. The filing of an annulment case does not suspend the running of the redemption period nor bar the issuance of the writ. Petitioners’ proper remedy from the trial court’s order granting the writ was an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari, as any error committed would be one of judgment, not jurisdiction. The trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in performing its ministerial duty.