G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents

FACTS

Pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez (a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo) for various charges including conspiracy to defraud the United States, tax evasion, wire fraud, false statements, and illegal campaign contributions. The Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a Petition for Extradition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, praying for Jimenez’s immediate arrest under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Extradition Law). Before the RTC could act, Jimenez filed a motion praying that the application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the motion, held a hearing, and subsequently issued an Order directing the issuance of an arrest warrant but also granting bail to Jimenez in the amount of One Million Pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) in cash. The Government of the United States, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed a Petition for Certiorari directly with the Supreme Court, assailing the RTC Orders for setting a hearing prior to the arrest warrant’s issuance and for granting bail.

ISSUE

1. Whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for arrest can be issued in extradition proceedings.
2. Whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.

RULING

1. On the notice and hearing prior to arrest: NO. The Court ruled that the prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of an arrest warrant. The nature of extradition proceedings is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which calls into operation all the rights of an accused under the Bill of Rights. The arrest of a prospective extraditee is not for the purpose of punishing him for a crime, but to make him available for the extradition proceedings. The specific provision of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 states that upon filing of the petition, the judge “shall issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused” if it appears that the same is proper. The use of “shall” connotes a mandatory duty. The law does not require notice or hearing before the issuance of the warrant. The judge’s role at this stage is purely executive, involving an ex parte determination of whether a warrant of arrest should issue based on the petition and supporting documents.
2. On the right to bail: NO, as a general rule. The constitutional right to bail under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is available only in criminal proceedings. Extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. The provision on bail in the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 114) applies only to criminal proceedings. P.D. No. 1069, the governing law on extradition, does not provide for bail. The presumption, therefore, is against the availability of bail. However, the Court recognized a narrow exception. Bail may be granted, but only as an exception, upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the applicant, once granted bail, will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grant of bail is a matter of judicial discretion, not of right. In this case, Jimenez failed to present evidence of special circumstances justifying bail. The conditions imposed by the RTC (surrender of passport, inclusion in Hold Departure List, cash bond) were insufficient to guarantee against flight risk, especially given the strong incentive for an extraditee to flee. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the Petition, set aside the challenged RTC Orders, and ordered the immediate arrest and detention of Jimenez.